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REPUDIATION OF PATENT PROTECTION BY EXTENSION
OF SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
THE recent litigation between the DeForest Radio Company and
the Radio Corporation of America is illustrative of the basic con-
flict between the principles embodied in the Clayton Act I and
those enacted by the patent statute.2 The present status of that
litigation indicates further an apparent tendency on the part of
the federal courts to draw the requisite dividing-line between
enforced competition and protected monopoly so as to restrict
within narrow limits the monopoly granted by the patent law.
The Radio Corporation, after acquiring patents on a large num-
ber of radio receiving sets through cross-licensing agreements,
had in turn licensed others to manufacture the sets, stipulating in
Clause 9 of the licensing agreements that the unpatented audion
tubes to make the sets "initially operative" be purchased ex-
clusively from the Radio Corporation.3 Control of virtually 100
per cent of the manufacture of radio receiving sets thus vested
in the Radio Corporation a practical monopoly in the sale of the
unpatented tubes. The DeForest Company, engaged in the man-
ufacture of such tubes, found itself deprived of any substantial
market for them by the restrictions embodied in Clause 9. It
therefore sought an injunction under Section 3 of the Clayton
Act to forbid the enforcement of these restrictions. A prelimi-
nary injunction was granted by the Federal District Court of
Delaware 4 affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and ap-
138 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1926).
2 "Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make,
use, and vend his discovery ... " 16 STAT. 201 (1870), 35 U. S. C. § 40
(1926).
3 Clause 9 reads: "The Radio Corporation hereby agrees to sell to the
Licensee and the Licensee hereby agrees to purchase from the Radio Cor-
poration the number, and only the number, of vacuum tubes to be used as
parts of the circuit licensed hereunder and required to make initially opera-
tive the apparatus licensed under this Agreement .... But the sale of
such tubes by the Radio Corporation to the Licensee shall not be construed
as granting any licenses except the right to sell such tubes for use in, and
to use them in, the apparatus made and sold hereunder."
4 Lord v. Radio Corporation of America, 24 F. (2d) 565 (D. Del. 1928).
5 Radio Corporation of America v. Lord, 28 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 3d,
1928). Note (1930) 1 Am L. REV. 132.
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proved by the United States Supreme Court in denying a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari6  Since then the case has been ac-
corded a full trial, the injunction made permanent 7 and the de-
cision of the District Court again affirmed by the Circuit Court
The Supreme Court has recently granted a second writ of cer-
tiorariY
Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits the lease or sale of
goods "whether patented or unpatented" on the condition that
the lessee or vendee refrain from using or dealing in the goods
of a competitor, where the effect "may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly." The "tying clause"
device against which the Section was directed " usually takes
the general form of a stipulation that the vendee or lessee of a
patented invention purchase exclusively from the patentee cer-
tain unpatented materials for use with the invention. Such re-
quirements as that the vendee buy from the vendor all metallic
fasteners for use in a patented button fastener machipe," or all
ink to be used in a patent mimeograph machine 12 were specifi-
cally contemplated by Congress at the time of drafting.2 The
Radio Corporation case seemed to raise the question of whether
the prohibition of Section 3 extends to a virtual monopoly of an
6 278 U. S. 648, 49 Sup. Ct. 83 (1928) ; rehearing denied, Jan. 3, 1929.
7 Lord v. Radio Corporation of America, 35 F. (2d) 962 (D. Del. 1929).
8 Radio Corporation of America v. DeForest Radio Co., 40 F. (2d) -
(C. C. A. 3d, 1931) (N. Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1931).
9 Supra note 1.
20 That the "tying clause" was particularly contemplated is shown by
earlier bills proposed in Congress by Mr. Thayer, H. R. 11380 and H. R.
11381, and by Mr. Lenroot, H. R. 15926, which contained an exception
"'that nothing in this Act shall be considered to prevent any such vendor,
lessor, or licensor from requiring that during the continuance of any Letters
Patent upon any such article no component or constitucnt part of the
tool, implement, appliance or machine required for use therein be pur-
chased except from the vendor, lessor or licensor, or from requiring that
material to be used in the operation of any machine must be obtained from
the vendor, lessor or licensor." The bill finally adopted, however, omitted
this exception and also the word "license."
1 Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896). The case held that one who sold metallic
fasteners for use in the plaintiff's patented machines, which the defendant
knew had been sold subject to the restriction, was a contributory infringer.
12 Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364 (1912). This
also was a suit for contributory infringement in which judgment was
given for the plaintiff on the authority of the button-fastener case. Both
of these cases were expressly overruled in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416 (1917),
infra note 16.
13 See the debates in Congress at the time Section 3 was passed, par-
ticularly the remarks of Senator Reed, 51 CON'NG. REC. 63, 14208 (1914);
of Senator Walsh, 51 CONG. REC. 14273 (1914); and of Senator Nelson,
51 CONG. REC. 15937 (1914).
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article which is an integral part of a patented product rather
than a separate product essential to its use. But the courts
avoided this problem by declaring that the audion tubes were
not such a part of the patented sets as to be included within the
statutory monopoly.
Yet even granting that the monopoly did not include the tubes,
a further contention, apparently intended by the careful wording
of Clause 9, remained to the Radio Corporation. This was that
the licensing device was not such a sale or lease as is outlawed
by Section 3, but rather an assignment of patent rights such as
is specifically permitted by the patent statute. Certainly it is
clear that if a patentee reserve to himself the privilege of manu-
facturing his invention, there can be no valid objection to his
equipping it, before sale, with his own unpatented materials or
accessories. Then the transfer of the privilege of manufacture
coupled with the retention of the right to furnish certain articles
might well be interpreted as a partial assignment of the patent
monopoly and hence enforceable.14 Moreover, such a split-up of
the patent rights would not increase the scope of the original
monopoly. And in another sense, the licensing of several con-
cerns, as in the Radio Corporation arrangement, actually creates
a measure of retail competition.
Considered from the angle of the restriction itself, Clause 9 is
far less extensive than the ordinary "tying clause" in a lease 15
or sale 16 because the license restriction terminates upon the sale
of the article to the consumer. Thus, instead of an attempt to
force all users to buy accessories, replacements or materials for
future use from the patentee, the replacement market is opened
to competitors, such as the DeForest Company, from the instant
of the initial sale. A persuasive analogy lies in the control of
14 The Supreme Court has held that the monopoly granted by the patent
law is freely assignable in part. Virtue v. Creamery Package Manu-
facturing Co., 227 U. S. 8, 33 Sup. Ct. 202 (1913). For a general discus-
sion see Lamb, The Patent Law and the Anti-Trust Law (1927) 12 CONN.
L. Q. 261.
15 A restriction requiring the lessee to purchase all materials for use in
the patented machines leased, and to use the machines exclusively in certain
operations and only on articles on which other operations had been per-
formed by the lessor has been held invalid under Section 3. United
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct. 363 (1922).
In answering the contention that Section 3 conflicted with the right to
assign the patent grant, the Court said: "The patent right confers no
privilege to make contracts in themselves illegal, and certainly not to
make those violative of valid statutes of the United States." 258 U. S. at
463, 42 Sup. Ct. at 367.
1G Motion-Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., eupra
note 12. The Court held invalid a stipulation attached to a patented
motion picture machine that it be used solely with the films furnished by
the patentee or original vendor.
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sales prices which the Supreme Court has granted to patentees.
Here it has been held that a patentee in licensing the manu-
facture of his invention may stipulate its sales price 17 but may
not extend such control beyond the first sale. 8
Contentions such as these had previously induced lower fed-
eral courts to hold that Section 3 did not extend to licensing
agreements."9 But in the instant case the courts again side-
stepped an issue which seemed clearly presented by the facts, in
applying Section 3 against the sale of tubes to licensees rather
than against the licensing agreements themselves.21 Thus the
holding was not that the requirement of purchase of tubes from
the Radio Corporation was an invalid condition of the license to
manufacture, but that prohibition of purchase elsewhere was an
invalid condition of the sale of the tubes. Moreover the replace-
ment market as an outlet for competitive products was con-
sidered too small to negative the monopoly.2' It would be in-
teresting to know how the courts would have disposed of an
arrangement whereby the instant licensees had instead been
designated as agents of the Radio Corporation for the purpose
of manufacturing sets. For contracts of agency, as such, are
not within the scope of Section 3; 22 and from the legal angle it
would seem that a patentee might place the manufacture of his
product in the hands of an agent without losing the privilege
of furnishing his own accessories before putting the finished
product on the market.
Whatever harm has been done the DeForest Company would
17 Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747
(1902); United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct.
192 (1926); (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 656.
's Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616 (1913) ; Federal Trade
Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 42 Sup. CL 150 (1922) ;
Munson, Control of Patented and Copyrighted Articles After Sale (1917) 26
YALE L.J. 270; Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance (1928) 28 COL.
L. Rnv. 312, 441; (1918) 86 CENT. L. J. 275; (1918) 22 COL. L. RMv. 351;
(1922) 35 HARv. L. REV. 772.
19 Western Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., 268
Fed. 121 (D. Del. 1920); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 269 Fed.
796 (D. Del. 1920).
20 "To hold that a contract for the sale of goods is not within the
Clayton Act, if it is embodied as a condition or covenant of a license agree-
ment would, I think, be writing into that statute a nullifying limitation
and running counter to the views of the Supreme Court so broadly and
emphatically expressed." Lord v. Radio Corporation, supra, note 4, at 567.
Nevertheless the condition is not imposed on the sale of the tubes but on
the license itself. The word "license" was included in original drafts of
Section 3 but omitted in the final wording. Supra note 10.
21 Lord v. Radio Corporation, .supra note 4, at 568.
2 Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 270 Fed. 881
(C. C. A. 3d, 1921); cf. United States v. General Electric Co., supra note
17. See Klaus, op. cit. supra note 18, at 450.
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seem more directly due to the accumulation by the Radio Cor-
poration of an air-tight monopoly on the manufacture of receiv-
ing sets than to the operation of Clause 9 of the licensing agree-
ments. This monopoly once removed, the DeForest Company
could have found an ample market for its tubes in spite of Clause
9. Nor could the courts then have held the Clause inoperative
under Section 3. For the Section specifically postulates a sub-
stantial stifling of competition. And the Supreme Court has
refused to invalidate a condition in a lease of gasoline pumps,
that they be used only with gasoline furnished by the lessor, on
the ground that the restriction did not eliminate competition
with other brands of gasoline.23  Hence the more logical remedy
of the DeForest Company, and others who had been "squeezed
out" of the radio tube business, would seem to have rested in an
action under the Sherman Law and Section 4 of the Clayton Act
to dissolve the Radio Corporation's patent monopoly.
Just such a suit has since been brought by the government and
is now pending in the District Court of Delaware.24 If success-
ful, the same xesult would be accomplished for the radio tube
business as was achieved by the instant injunction. Solution of
the problem in this manner would obviate the necessity of a
holding which seems tenuously grounded and susceptible to un-
fortunate projection, in the face of the present patent law. More
significantly, such a solution would eliminate the danger, implicit
in the instant decisions, that a patentee will be deprived of the
privilege of insuring the successful functioning of his device,
when the courts allow it to be coupled with accessories essential
to its use and inferior to those which he could furnish.
23 Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 43
Sup. Ct. 450 (1923). Accord: Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-0-Lite
Co., 276 Fed. 537 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) (lease of tanks with stipulation
that they be used only with the acetylene gas of the lessor) ; (1922) 31
YALE L. J. 668; cf. Connecticut Telephone & Electric Co. v. Automotive
Equipment Co., 14 F. (2d) 957 (D. N. J. 1926) (sale of patented appliances
on condition all parts be purchased exclusively from the patentee). In all
of these cases the Court stressed the fact that there was no provision
prohibiting the lessee or vendee from dealing in the products of a competi-
tor. Such a provision is clearly invalid. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 42 Sup. Ct. 360 (1923). In addition, in all
of the above cases where the restriction was upheld there was considerable
competition in the fields of both patented and unpatented articles.
24 This suit is brought on the ground that the Radio Corporation has
acquired an illegal monopoly by virtue of cross-licensing agreements and
other patent pooling devices. Such large patent pools have been held
illegal. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 U. S.
20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912). A possible defense to such an attack would
seem to be proof that the acquisition of patents on competing combinations
had made possible the manufacture of complete sets embodying the best
factors and devices of each combination, so that the public bad been bene-
fited by the marketing of a greatly superior product.
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Judicial disposition of the radio tube litigation, however, indi-
cates the zeal of the courts to carry out the spirit of the anti-
trust laws, even at the expense of whatever advantages might
lie in a less narrow application of the patent statute and its
irreconcilable principles. Not only the dubious ruling as to
Clause 9 of the licensing agreement, but also the cursory dis-
missal of the claim that the tubes were included in the patents,
bear witness to the tendency. For the decision that the tubes
were not so included, though apparently inevitable and auto-
matic, might easily have been settled to the contrary in accord-
ance with the descriptions in the patent claims 25 and with prior
court rulings. Thus it has been held that a patent on baking
powder covers the separate unpatented ingredients -1 and that a
patent on a combination of phonograph and needle covers the un-
patented record, -2 7 so that unlicensed sale of the ingredients or
the records with the knowledge that they are to be used in the
patented combination amounts to contributory infringement.
In the past, the tendency to confine the scope of patent monop-
olies had been apparent only where the anti-trust laws were spe-
cifically considered..2 , But the attitude of the Supreme Court to-
ward the present litigation and its decision in the recent con-
tributory infringement case of Carbice Corporation v. American
Patents Development Corporation 2.1 seem to indicate that, in that
Court at least, the tendency has developed into a general policy
with regard to the patent law. However useful such a policy
25 The claim for the Alexanderson patent, one of those acquired by the
Radio Corporation, would seem to bear out the contention that the tube is
an integral part of the patented circuit. It is described as follows: "A
tuned receiving system for detecting sustained oscillations of a given fre-
quency comprising a plurality of circuits resonant to the frequency of the
oscillations to be detected and arranged in cascade, relay devices (tubes)
joining each of said circuits to another comprising an evacuated envelcp,
an electron-emitting cathode, a co-operating anode, and a grid, said device
(tube) being connected to one of said circuits at the cathode and grid and
to another circuit at the cathode and anode and a local source of energ ,
in the second circuit." See, Thacher, J., in Radio Corporation et a. v.
E. J. Edmond & Co., 20 F. (2d) 929, 930 (S. D. N. Y. 1927).
2 Rumford Chemical Works v. New York Baking Powder Co., 1)0 Fed.
873 (S. D. N. Y. 1905).
27Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 325, 2f)
Sup. Ct. 503 (1909).
28 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., supra note 12 at
517, 37 Sup. Ct. at 421; United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, supra
note 15.
29 U. S. Daily, Mar. 10, 1931, at 70. This case holds that a patent cov-
ering a special combination container for ice cream and dry-ice did not
.prevent the defendant from selling the unpatented dry ice with the
knowledge it would be used in the plaintiff's combination. With regard to
the litigation in Lord v. Radio Corporation the Court said: "The attempt
to use the patent monopoly to restrain commerce is not only beyond the
scope of the grant, but also a direct violation of the anti-trust laws."
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might be in fostering free competition, it cannot but discourage
large industries from investing capital in the scientific research
and extensively equipped laboratories which have been so pro-
ductive of invention in the last decade. If opposition springs
from the fact that industrial capital thus reaps a large share
of the inventor's reward, a better-considered remedy lies in ac-
commodation of the patent laws to the technological and finan-
cial developments which have completely revolutionized industry
since the patent act was passed.
TAXABILITY OF GAIN DERIVED FROM THE LIQUIDA-
TION OF A LIABILITY AT LESS THAN FACE VALUE
A COMMON feature of depressed financial markets is the quo-
tation of corporate bonds at prices substantially below par. A
purchase by a corporation of its own bonds at such a time re-
sults in a saving of the difference between the par and market
value of the bonds, a saving which, according to accounting prac-
tice, is transferred to the "surplus" of the corporation.' Yet any
corporation or other enterprise whose cash position permits it
to take advantage of distress selling of its own securities, later
finds itself confronted with the question of whether the result-
ing increase in its surplus is taxable income under the Federal
Income Tax Law.
This question was recently answered in the negative in Kirby
Lumber Co. v. United States,2 where it appeared that the corpo-
ration issued bonds at par and later in the same year retired them
after repurchasing them on the open market at less than par.
The Court of Claims held that a difference of $137,521.30 between
the par value and repurchase price of the bonds did not consti-
tute taxable income. Considerable authority for this decision
may be found in similar rulings of the Board of Tax Appeals
where the same question has arisen with respect to bonds, pre-
'The Interstate Commerce Commission so directs. See, for example,
CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME, PROFIT AND LOSS, AND GENERAL BALANCE SHEET
ACCOUNTS FOR STEAM ROADS (Interstate Commerce Commission, 1914) 34,
§ 607; UNIFORM CLASSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES
(Illinois Commerce Commission, 1923) 56, Account No. 503; SUNLEY AND
PINKERTON, CORPORATION ACCOUNTING (1931) 259.
2 U. S. Daily, Dec. 5, 1930, at 3041 (Ct. C1. 1930).
3 Independent Brewing Co., 4 B. T. A. 870 (1926) (IX-1 Cum. Bull. 68);
New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Ry., 6 B. T. A. 436 (1927) (VII-1 Cum.
Bull. 39); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry., 6 B. T. A. 1364 (1927) (VII-2
Cum. Bull 48); Indianapolis Street Ry., 7 B. T. A. 397 (1927) (VII-1 Cum.
Bull. 38); National Sugar Manufacturing Co., 7 B. T. A. 577 (1927) (VII-1
Cum. Bull. 39); General Manifold & Printing Co., 12 B. T. A. 436 (1928)
(IX-1 Cum. Bull. 65); Douglas County Light & Water Co., 14 B. T. A.
1052 (1929); Eastern S. S. Lines, 17 B. T. A. 787 (1929) (IX-1 Cum. Bull.
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fered stock 4 and compositions with general creditors.5 But
the frequent dissent from the position adopted by the majority of
the board 6 and the persistent refusal of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to alter the "Regulation" declaring a contrary
rule for corporate bonds,7 prompts a consideration of both the
authorities and the accounting problems involved.
All the auttiorities regarded as controlling the instant case
have directly or indirectly been predicated upon the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire
Co." There an American corporation in 1913 borrowed from a
German bank an amount of money repayable in marks or their
equivalent in the United States. The bank becoming an enemy
alien upon the outbreak of war with Germany, the obligation was
settled by payment to the Alien Property Custodian of a sum
substantially below the amount of American money borrowed.,
The Court ruled that no taxable income had been realized from
this transaction. Ostensibly this decision was based upon the
definition of income established in Eisner v. Macomber ° as
"gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,
provided it be understood to include profit gained through a
sale or conversion of capital." But the particular stress laid
upon the presence of past losses in excess of the amount of
money borrowed indicates that this was not the sole basis of the
64); North American Mortgage Co., 18 B. T. A. 418 (1929); American
Tobac~o Co., 20 B. T. A. 591 (1930); Houghton & Dutton Building Trust,
20 B. T. A. 586 (1930). References in the parentheses are to the con-
trary holdings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See infra note 6.
4Liberty Agency Co., 5 B. T. A. 778 (1926).
Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B. T. A. 1319 (1926); John F. Campbell Co., 15
B. T. A. 458 (1929) (VIII-2 Cum. Bull 60); Simmons Gin Co., 16 B. T. A.
793 (1929) (IX-1 Cum. Bull. 75), aff ', 43 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. 10th,
1930); Eastside Manufacturing Co., 18 B. T. A. 461 (1929).
6 To most of the cases one member, Sternhagen, dissented without opin-
ion. He expresses himself, however, in National Sugar Manufacturing
Co., supra note 3, at 578, and in John F. Campbell Co., supra note 5, at 460.
As to the non-acquiescence of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue see
supra notes 3 and 5.
7See U. S. TREAS. REG. 74, Art. 68 (1929): Sale and retirement by corpora-
tion of its bonds-(1) (a) If bonds are issued by a corporation at their
face value, the corporation realizes no gain or loss .... (e) If, however,
the corporation purchases and retires any of such bonds at a price less
than the issuing price or facd value, the excess of the issuing price or
face value over the purchase price is gain or income for the taxable year."
In regard to cancellation of a debt see infra note 26.
8 271 U. S. 170, 46 Sup. Ct. 449 (1926). See adverse criticism in (1925)
34 Y.LE L. J. 334; (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 110; Cf. MON'rGOAMnY, INC0MI
TAx PRocEDuRu (1927) 327, 328: "It is unfortunate that the opinion is
not clearer."
" The settlement was based on a valuation of the mark at 2', cents. The
saving amounted to $684,456.18.
10 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193 (1920).
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Bowers decision; for if the intention was to view this profit as in
no wise taxable income, then the further discussion of the pre-
ponderance of past losses is mere surplusage. Any attempt to
offset past losses against the profit seems necessarily to assume
a presently taxable gain.
Admitting with the Court that "income" may be defined as
in the Eisner case, the exclusive application of this definition to
a gain derived from the liquidation of a liability at less than
face is hardly justifiable when viewed in the light of the purpose
of the Federal Income Tax law.1' The net effect of the repur-
chase transaction is a reduction of liabilities accompanied by -a
corresponding increase in net worth.12 This increase, while
strictly not derived either from invested capital or labor, is never-
theless a gain presently realized which not only increases the book
value of the corporate stock but may even be available for divi-
dend distribution. The fallacy of not taxing such a gain is appar-
ent when the transactions involved take place over a period of
years. In the determination of net income in a particular year,
gross income is reduced by costs and expenses valued at the
amount paid or expected to be paid.13 The net income so deter-
mined is then taxable. If later the indebtedness is settled by part
payment and cancellation of the balance, these liabilities are act-
ually liquidated at less than the original estimate, i. c., that used
in computing the tax. The difference between the estimated and
actual cost should therefore be treated either (1) as a reduction
of the cost in the year in which the estimate was made, or else
(2) as income in the year in which the indebtedness was in fact
cancelled.14 To do otherwise allows the taxpayer, in computing
11 U. S. Const. Amend. XVI. See Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. V. Smie-
tanka, 255 U. S. 509, 516, 41 Sup. Ct. 386, 387 (1921) re "the comprehensive
last clause [in the Revenue Act] 'gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever."' Cf. Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U. S.
179, 185, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 469 (1918) "[income] conveying rather the idea
of gain or increase arising from corporate activity." .
12 The actual result is a decrease in liabilities of the par value of the
bonds accompanied (1) by a decrease in assets to the amount of cash paid
and (2) by an increase in net worth of the difference.
13 See the excelldnt dissenting opinion of Sternhagen in John F. Camp-
bell Co., op. cit. supra note 5, at 461: "The assumptions of the accrual
system which justify its recognition as a means of arriving at taxable in-
come include the assumption that when a deduction is taken for a cost
incurred there is a genuine anticipation of payment, and since the payment
will surely in future be made, it is entirely fair that the deduction be made
when the liability accrues instead of when paid, so long as the system
adopted be consistent and free from material distortion."
14 Ibid: "Where a deduction has been enjoyed upon the assumption that
a liability will be met to its full extent and the. assumption subsequently
proves erroneous, a proper adjustment should be made by way of either
restating the deduction for 1920 or treating the amount subsequently re-
mitted as a gain for 1921."
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his tax, to deduct the entire face amount of a liability which he
subsequently pays only in part.
The same argument applies where losses have occurred in prior
years which have already been deducted from net income at their
face amount. By repayment of the obligation at less than face
it is found that the net losses are not of the magnitude believed
when the tax was computed. Again one of two results should
follow: (1) the amount of loss deducted in the year when it
occurred should be reduced and the tax return adjusted accord-
ingly, or (2) the saving should be added to the income in the
year in which it is realized.
From an administrative point of view, to reopen tax returns
years after they have been filed is hardly feasible. Moreover,
analysis reveals two elements involved in the normal credit trans-
action: (1) the securing of funds or credit and the subsequent
repayment of the obligation, and (2) the investment of the fund
or use of the property obtained on credit. Thus there are two
possibilities of gain to the debtor; first, by a profitable invest-
ment or use of the funds or property, and second, by the repay-
ment, for some reason, of less than the amount borrowed. These
two transactions, the one of lending and borrowing and the other
of investment or productive use, have no necessary relation to
one another. The statement of the Supreme Court that "the
mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit or income" Is is true
in so far as it applies to the net returns for a given year. But
when applied to returns filed over a period of years it should not
dispense with the requirement that profits and losses be sepa-
rately reported.
An examination of the Board of Tax Appeals cases reveals
that the decisions have not only followed the Bowers case on its
facts but have extended its scope to cases in which no prior losses
were shown to have occurred."' As if to demonstrate that "hard
cases make bad law" the earliest bond repurchase case in the
Board of Tax Appeals was tndependent Brewing Co.Y where
it appeared that the repurchased bonds were secured by a mort-
gage on properties which, although greatly depreciated by rea-
son of the advent of prohibition, would not show a tax deduct-
able loss until the depreciation was realized by their sale. Tax-
ing the profit here would have forced the payment of a large tax
immediately whereas the corporation would have to wait in-
5  Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., supra note 8, at 175, 46 Sup. Ct. at 451.
16 See National Sugar Manufacturing Co., szpra note . In most of the
cases cited supra note 3 there were no prior losses. In Kirby Lumber Co.,
19 B. T. A. 1046 (1930), losses were shown in 1925. The Commissioner
reduced the loss by the amount of gain made through the repurchase of
bonds. The court held this error. Thus there is no "diminution of loss"




definitely before it could offset the corresponding, though as
yet unrealized, losses. Faced with this situation the Board held
(four members dissenting) that no taxable income was derived
from the repurchase of the bonds. The unfortunate situation
of one taxpayer, however, hardly justifies the adoption of a rule
which, as pointed out above, functions badly in the reverse situa-
tion occuring more frequently, i. e., where the losses have
been realized and already deducted from the taxable income in
past years or where no losses whatever have been incurred.
Repurchase transactions taking place within an affiliated group
have been held to give rise to no taxable gain.18 Since such trans-
actions are merely capital adjustments the resulting profits or
losses may reasonably be regarded as bookkeeping entries only."t
Even where a corporation purchases the bonds of another corpo-
ration below par and later acquires either all the assets or capital
stock of that corporation, a subsequent retirement of the bonds
purchased may likewise be reasonably regarded as only a capital
transaction.20 Here the net effect of the retirement of the bonds
is to reduce the cost of the subsidiary to the purchasing corpora-
tion. A necessary corollary, however, is that the books of the
purchasing corporation correctly show the actual cost of the sub-
sidiary and not the cost as determined when the bonds are in-
cluded at par.
The Treasury Regulations specify the method of computing
the amount of gain derived from a repurchase transaction. '
Because of differences between the interest rate agreed upon in
the bond contract and the market rate of interest, corporations
frequently issue their bonds above par where the bond rate is
higher than the market rate, or below, when the reverse situa-
tion obtains. In either case, to maintain the investor's return
at the market rate of interest, the value of the bonds approaches
par as the maturity date nears. This difference between present
market value and par represents the unamortized discount or
premium and the adjustment of the bond to the market rate of in-
terest.22 Thus a gain from the repurchase of bonds occurs when-
ever the corporation buys at less than this actual or present value
(irrespective of par) and the amount of the gain is to be meas-
18 U. S. TREAS. REG. 75, Art. 31 (1930). Liberty Agency Co., 5 B. T. A.
778 (1926); MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (1929) 36.
19 But carefully distinguish the case where a subsidiary buys its own
bonds froni the parent from the case where the parent buys bonds of a
subsidiary in the open market.
20 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 13 B. T. A. 988, 1026 (1928); ef.
American Seating Co., 14 B. T. A. 328 (1928).
21 U. S. TRnAs REG. 74, Art. 68, §§ 2-3 (1929).
22 2 KESTER, ACCOUNTING THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1925) 201. For
a technical discussion of the theory and methods of amortization in detail
see 2 FINNEY, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1927) c. 44.
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ured by this difference.
With one exception no difference in the rule should be made
where a corporation repurchases its own bonds for investment
purposes only and not for immediate retirement. 3 From an
administrative point of view, it would seem advisable to adopt a
single method of taxation for all types of transactions involving
the repurchase of a company's own bonds, instead of setting up
a distinction based upon the nebulous idea of intent. To defer
taxation until the bonds are actually cancelled causes confusion
especially with long term obligations, since a considerable period
of time may intervene between repurchase and retirement. This
would require later examination of the books and records kept
during the entire period and a tracing of each bond or group of
bonds through a great many transactions. Furthermore if the
bonds are resold it will be because the corporation needs money.
Such a sale will take place with reference to current money con-
ditions and the resale price will bear no relation, as a gain or
loss, to the price at which the bonds were repurchased. The
difference between the resale price and par, representing only
the adjustment of the bond rate to the market rate of interest,
should be amortized over the period which the bonds have yet to
run and be deducted as interest during that period.24
The one exception which should be made to this rule arises
when a corporation can show positively that the bonds were re-
purchased merely to afford a means for temporary use of tem-
porarily idle money, i.e., money for which the corporation will
obviously have use in the relatively immediate future, as for the
payment of maturing interest or debts. The question of retire-
ment is not concerned in such a transaction. Cases falling with-
in this exception should be limited to those where the resale
would take place within a comparatively short time, thus obvia-
23 The Board of Tax Appeals makes no distinction whatfver between
bonds purchased for retirement or investment: no taxable income is re-
ceived in either case. Petaluma & Santa Rosa R. R., 11 B. T. A. 541 (1928).
The Commissioner acquiesced in this decision with regard to bonds re-
purchased and held for investment. VII-2 Cum. Bull. 31. And see, in
accord, MONTGOMERY, INCOmE. TAx PROCEDURE (1927) 330.
24For example, a corporation, having originally issued 5Wt bonds at
their par value of $100, repurchases some of them at $86. The corporation
will hardly resell at $91 merely because it can make a "profit" over the re-
purchase price of $86. Rather the resale price is calculated to yield a 65
return to the investor. The bonds cannot be sold at a higher price and cor-
respondingly smaller yield nor, on the other hand, is there any reason why
the corporation should give the investor a larger yield, providing that the
bonds can be readily sold. It would appear, therefore, that the proper
handling of the transaction for tax purposes is to tax the corporation upon
a gain of $14 upon the repurchase of the bonds, and to permit it to
amortize the difference between the resale price and par, deducting it as
interest paid over the period which the bonds have yet to run.
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ting the administrative difficulties which beset a long delay before
retirement. This exception is strictly in accord with the ac-
counting practice of carrying such bonds at their cost price with-
out profit to the corporation.2r Essentially they are treated as if
the obligation of another corporation.
Those cases in which a debtor settles with his general credi-
tors for a fraction of the face amount of his debts present further
difficulties. Whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent may con-
ceivably make a difference in result. The Treasury Regulations
on the point, which in general beg the question, are specific in
holding a gift those cases where "a creditor merely desires to
benefit a debtor and without any consideration therefor cancels
the debt." 26 That the release of part of a debt upon the pay-
ment of part is any less a gift is difficult to perceive. Yet, al-
though theoretically the taxable nature of the item does not
change with the circumstances of the debtor, policy donsidera-
tions may well dictate a more lenient rule in behalf of the in-
solvent. 27  The Board of Tax Appeals has held, following the
"rule" of the Bowers case, that release of a debt gives rise to no
taxable income.28 And a similar result has been reached by a
Circuit Court of Appeals 2 which held that a release of debt to
a corporation by its sole shareholder was not "income" but a
capital contribution.
The final determination of the taxability of a gain realized
from the discharge of a debt at less than its face amount lies with
the Supreme Court. It is not too much to hope that that Court,
if it will not directly overrule the Bowers case, will at least con-
fine it to' its specific facts and terminate the unwarranted ex-
tensions which now result in a considerable loss of what should
be taxable income.
25 FINNEY, op. cit. supra note 22, at c. 43, p. 9; KESTEII, op. cit. supra note
22 at 179. In this situation profits and losses on the resale are computed
with reference to the purchase price.
26 "The cancellation and forgiveness of indebtedness may amount to a
payment of income, to a gift, or to a capital transaction, dependent on the
circumstances." U. S. TREAS. REG. 74, Art. 64 (1929). See the comment
on this article, 1 STANDARD FEDERAL TAX SERVICE (C. C. H. 1931) par. 77.04.
27 This is suggested in one case in which the court, by way of dictum,
said: "There is a distinction between a release or discharge of a liability
to a solvent and to an insolvent debtor." Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue v. Simmons Gin Co., 43 F. (2d) 327, 329 (C. C. A, 10th, 1930).
28 The cases are cited supra note 5. That the solvency or insolvency of
the debtor is immaterial see Simmons Gin Co., 16 B. T. A. 793, 798 (1929).




LNDIRECT CENSORSHIP OF RADIO PROGRAIS
THE only express standard by which the Federal Radio Com-
mission is governed in the exercise of its licensing authority is
"public interest, convenience or necessity." I In itsoinitial task
of distributing the limited number of "channels" among the
numerous applicants for licenses and in its later work of pro-
viding an equal allocation of broadcasting service, both of trans-mission and reception, to each of the five "zones," 2 the Commis-
sion found that "public interest, convenience and necessity" re-
quired first the elimination of the various types of interference
such as heterodyning, cross-talk, and blanketing, and the crea-
tion of a fairly distributed, well diversified and regularly scheduled
broadcasting service.3 As yet the question as to what a station
may broadcast has not received a great deal of attention; but
in passing upon an application for the renewal of a license it has
'This phrase occurs with variations in Sections 4, 9, 11 and 21 of the
Radio Act of 1927. 44 STAT. 1163, 1166, 1167, 1170 (1927), 47 U. S. C. A.
§§ 84, 89, 91, 101 (Supp. 1930). See Caldwell, The Standard of Pulbic
Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927
(1930) 1 AiR L. REy. 295, 297; SECOND ANIN',AL REPOrT OF FraERML TIDI0
CoMMIssSoN (Supp. 1928) 166 [hereinafter cited 2d A. R. F. R. C. (Supp.
1928) ]. The phrase has a public utility origin. From the transmission
standpoint broadcasting stations are not and should not be treatcd as
public utilities. To do so would deprive such stations of a beneficial power
of censorship over their own programs. From the standpoint of rccep-
tion, however, they are subject to an obligation corresponding to the ob-
ligation of public utilities to render adequate service. See In the matter
of the application of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., No. 4900, reprinted
in 3d A. R. F. R. C. (1929) 32; Ashby, Legal Aspects of Radio Broadcting
(1930) 1 Am L. REv. 330, 346; W. JEFFRSON DuvIs, RAIo LAW (2d ed.
1930) 66; STEPHEN DAvIs, LAW OF RADmo (1927) 105-7. It has been sug-
gested that considerable assistance in interpreting the standard may be
found in the analogy of the public utility cases. Caldwell, op. cit. upra,
at 317. On the other hand since the standard must be applied to a variety
of types of stations it must receive a more liberal interpretation than in the
case of public utilities. (1929) 54 A. B. A. REP. 456; W. JEFFMrSoN DAvis,
RADio LAW (2d ed. 1930) 184; Comment (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 245, 251.
2 Section 2 of the Act of 1927 divided the country into five zones. Sec-
tion 9 of the Act was amended by the Act of 1928, 44 STAT. 373 (1928),
47 U. S. C. A. § 89 (Supp. 1930), to provide for equality of service among
the zones. This amendment, known as the Davis Amendment, necessitated
General Order No. 40 (as amended by General Order No. 87) by which 40
cleared channels, 44 regional channels and 6 local channels were established
for broadcasting purposes. See Ashby, op. cit. supra note 1, at 338; 2d
A. R. F. R. C. (1928) 48.
3 See 2d A. R. F. R. C. (Supp. 1928) 166. There has been an attempt
to prevent duplication of like service in the same community. Where one
community is underserved and another is receiving duplication of the same
order of programs the second community is given preference over the
former. The Davis Amendment, supra note 2, was a partial limitation upon
the power of the Commission in applying the standard.
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become increasingly necessary to take this into account, princi-
pally through a consideration of the character of past programs.4
In determining whether the programs of a particular station
have met the test of "public interest, convenience or necessity"
the Commission has felt constrained to consider carefully Sec-
tion 29 of the Act of 1927, which forbids to the Commission the
power of "censorship" or interference with the "right of free
speech." 5 The term "censorship" when used to denote interfer-
ence with the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech has
generally been interpreted to mean "previous restraint." " Yet
although the Commission may have no power to scrutinize and
reject programs prior to their release, the power to revoke or
refuse the renewal of a license is in many cases so effective a
means of "censorship" as to make unconvincing any legalistic
distinction between "previous restraint" and a refusal to renew
a license because of the character of past programs.7 As a prac-
tical matter the prohibition against "censorship," in the sense of
prohibiting a scrutiny and rejection of programs prior to their
broadcast, is justified by the administrative difficulities which
would be involved in such "censorship." 8 Furthermore there is
less likelihood of an abuse of discretion in applying the test of
"public interest, convenience or necessity" when the Commission
4 It is difficult to determine to what extent the Commission has con-
sidered the character of the past programs of. an applicant for renewal
of a license. Statement of facts and grounds for decision are not filed
unless the case is appealed to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia. Section 16 of the Act of 1927; 4th A. R. F. R. C. (1930) 41.
The Commission may, among other reasons, be influenced by the lack of
financial responsibility, the untrustworthiness or poor technical equipment
of the applicant. See 2d A. R. F. R. C. (Supp. 1928) 153, 169. In Janu-
ary 1929 Commissioner Robbins testified that the Commission has been
troubled by complaints as to the use of the radio for the perpetration of
fraudulent schemes, the urging of boycotts and unfair advertising. HEAR-
INGS ON H. R. 15430 (70th Cong. 2d Sess. 1929) 8. The Commission has to
some extent been guided by the reaction of the public to the broadcasts of
certain stations, as exhibited in the thousands of communications which
come to it annually. 2d A. R. F. R. C. (Supp. 1928) 154. In the begin-
ning it was apparently felt that the character of the programs could be
controlled to a large extent by the force of public opinion and the censor-
ship powers of the stations themselves. See address of Commissioner
Bellows, April 29, 1927, reprinted in 1st A. R. F. R. C. (1927) 6.
z In come cases the Commission has ignored complaints and its own opin-
ion on the quality of the programs for fear less it should overstep the
powers given to it and violate the prohibition against censorship. See 2d
A. R. F. R. C. (Supp. 1928) 160.
6 See 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIIrrATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 884; Pat-
terson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462, 27 Sup. Ct. 556, 562; Rosenberg,
Censorship in the United States (1928) 32 LAW NOTES 49, 50.
7 The usual term of a license is 90 days, though it may be less.. See W.
JEFFERSON DAviS, RADIO LAW (2d ed. 1930) 140.
" See ZOLLmAN, Liv OF THE AIR (1927) 108.
COMMENTS
is limited simply to refusing or revoking a license than if it were
empowered to delete or modify programs prior to their intended
release. The prohibition against "censorship" acts as a caution to
the Commission to consider the general character of the service
rendered by the station instead of the disapproved but mooted
character of a particular program. It is significant that in the few
cases where a real question of "censorship" has been involved
and adverse action taken upon an application for a renewal of a
license, the decisions were not based upon the Commission's
disapproval of the views expressed in a particular program or
series of programs but rather on the ground that the programs
indicated that the station was being devoted largely to the purely
personal interests of the licensee or another without any attempt
at public serviceY Whatever may be the legal significance of an
immunity from "censorship" or interference with the "right of
free speech" standing alone, in the field of radio such immunity
is so qualified by the requirement that the programs meet the
test of "public interest, convenience or necessity" as to amount
to little more than a right that the Commission shall act rea-
sonably and without discrimination in the exercise of its licens-
ing authority.
Because of the excessive number of applicants and the limited
number of broadcasting channels, the standard of "public interest,
convenieffce or necessity" becomes a determination of the rela-
tive public importance of the several programs broadcast." This
cannot be overemphasized. The question is not primarily how
innocuous the program may be but to what extent it serves a
public need by providing unduplicated and wholesome entertain-
ment or is of educational or aesthetic value. Competition be-
tween stations will tend in some degree to eliminate those sta-
tions which do not serve the interests of the public at large.
Each station by noting the reaction of its listeners will seek to
gain greater popularity by discontinuing such programs as re-
act unfavorably upon the public. To some extent each listener
9 See statement of the Commission relative to putting four stations on
probation. 2d A. R. F. R. C. (Supp. 1928) 159. See also Schaeffer v. Fed-
eral Radio Commission, No. 5228 (1930). The removal of station KTNT
from the air has recently been recommended by Chief Examiner Yost for
the reason that it has been used as a "mere adjunct" of the owner's busi-
ness. See U. S. Daily, Mar. 10, 1931, at 72.
10 See Caldwell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 317; (1929) 54 A. B. A. RM..
460; the Head-of-the-Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commis-
sion, No. 4976 (1928), reprinted in 3d A. R. F. R. C. (1929) 36. This
does not mean that each applicant need not demonstrate its own merits
rather than rely on the defects of another. Missouri Broadcasting Corp.
v. Federal Radio Commission, No. 5204 (1930). On the question of the
weight given to priority of establishment on a specified channel see, Great
Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 37 F. (2d) 993 (Ct
of App. D. C. 1930); Chicago Federation of Labor v. Federal Radio Com-
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by the mere turning of the dial becomes a censor." In many
cases, however, the competitive system has broken down and the
public been placed at the merdy of an unscrupulous broadcasting
station. In these cases the Commission must interpose and act in
behalf of the interests of the radio public.
In the regulation of some aspects of radio broadcasting the
Commission has apparently had little difficulty in justifying
either a refusal to renew a license or a relegation of a licensee
to an inferior place on the air. There seems to be no sound ob-
jection to eliminating or allotting inferior privileges to those sta-
tions which do not maintain regular schedules, 12 fail consistently
to announce call numbers,"3 indulge in personal abuse with com-
peting stations, 4 permit personal attacks on the broadcaster's
enemies,1 allow the use of indecent or defamatory language,(
indulge excessively in "direct advertising" 17 or devote their time
to a service which is readily available to the public in another
form, such as constant playing of phonograph records. 8 There
mission, 41 F. (2d). 422 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1930); 1 Am L. Rav. 277, 419.
11 See In the matter of Great Lakes Broddcasting Co., No. 4900, re-
ported on appeal in 37 F. (2d) 993 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1930). See excerpts
from statement of the Commission's grounds for decision in this case, 3d
A. R. F. R. C. (1929) 32. In Schaeffer v. Federal Radio Commission, No.
5228 (1930), the Commission said: "It is a reassuring fact that usually
only those broadcasting stations which first establish themselves in the
confidence of the public whom they undertake to serve are successful in
establishing themselves on a sound financial basis. ... Where it is shown,
as in the case of Station KVEP, that the public had failed to lend its aid
for the station's support there is some indication that the legislative stand-
ard is not being met."
12 See Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Commission, No,
4835, 3d A. R. F. R. C. (1929) 31, aff'd, 36 F. (2d) 111 (Ct. of App. D. C.
1929).
3 This was one of the reasons for the recommended removal of the Debs
Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. Station from the air. See U. S. Daily, Mar.
4,1931, at 11.
'U Station WRAK was put on probation for this reason. 2d A. R. F. R.
C. (Supp. 1928) 159.
's This was one of the reasons for the refusal of the Commission to re-
new the license of WCOT. 2d A. R. F. R. C. (Supp. 1928) 152.
16 See supra.,note 14; § 29 of the Act of 1927.
17In reducing the power of WCRW from 500 to 100 watts, the Commis-
sion said: "Manifestly this station is one which exists chiefly for the pur-
pose of deriving an income from the sale of advertising of a character
which must be objectionable to the listening public and without making much,
if any, endeavor to render any real service to that public." 2d A. R. F. R.
C. (Supp. 1928) 156. By "direct" advertising is usually meant the men-
tion of specific commodities, the quoting of prices, and the soliciting of
orders to be sent directly to the advertiser or the radio station. By "in.
direct" advertising is usually meant advertising calculated simply to create
or maintain good will toward the advertiser. 2d A. R. F. R. C. (1928) 19.
18 See statement of the Commission in announcing its decision to revoke
the license of WJBA and reduce the power of WCRW. 2d A. R. F. R. C.
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is here no question of freedom of speech and the Commission is
well qualified to investigate and control such features of program
service.
A more difficult problem has arisen when the Commission has
been called upon to curb a station used almost exclusively for
the spreading of "propaganda." 1. Here it has acted cautiously
for fear of running counter to, the prohibition against censor-
ship2 0 and yet it has expressed the view that if the question were
raised now for the first time it would not license any propaganda
station.2 ' It is the belief of the Commission that the licensing
of any station which caters principally to the interests of a pri-
cate individual or a particular group gives it an unfair advan-
tage over others and results in limiting stations which serve the
interests of the public in general. The solution of this problem
would seem to lie in assuring such creeds, doctrines and beliefs
a place on the air only if the stations which they operate are in
general devoted to the service of the public at large rather than
to the broadcasting of their particular propaganda. If the Com-
mission acts without discrimination in curbing these stations there
would seem to be no reason to fear the prohibition against "censor,
ship" contained in the Act.
A still more troublesome problem confronting the Commission
is the regulation of radio advertising. Broadcasting stations in
this country are supported for the most part by advertisers and
a certain part of such advertising is offensive to the listening
public. The Commission has said that "advertising should be
only incidental to some real service rendered to the public and
not the main object of the program." 22  On the other hand the
(Supp. 1928) 155. The Commission recognized, however, that in some of
the smaller towns and farming communities the situation was not the same
as in the cities where large resources of program material are available.
' 9 An example of a propaganda station is WEVD in New York, the mouth-
piece of the Socialist Party; another is WIBA in Madison, spokesman for
the LaFollette progressive movement.
20 Concerning the stations referred to supra note 19, the Commission
said: "Wherever the evidence is shown that a particular station is serv-
ing as a mouthpiece for a substantial religious or political minority, no
matter how much the individual members may disagree with the views of
that minority, the commission has taken action favorable to the station."
2d A. R. F. R. C. (Supp. 1928) 160.
2-13d A. R. F. R. C. (1929) 35. Under the law prior to the Act of 1927
the Secretary of Commerce had no power to distinguish between stations or
even to refuse a license to any station. Hoover v. Intercity Radio, 280 Fed.
1003 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1923). As a result there are a number of stations
operated by religious or similar organizations. These stations are generally
put on part time or inferior channels. Radio audiences are peculiarly sen-
sitive to and resentful toward obvious propaganda. See .Radio Censorship,
114 INDEPENDENT 583 (May 23, 1925), partially reprinted in BE3Lu', CEN-
SoRSHIP OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS (1930) 87.
222d A. R. F. R. C. (1928) 168, reprinted in W. JEPEsoN Dwvis, Rizio
LAw (2d ed. 1930) 145.
1931]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Commission has recognized that:
"If a rule against advertising were enforced the public would
be deprived of millions of dollars worth of programs which are
given out by concerns simply for the resultant good will which is
believed to occur to the broadcaster or the advertiser by the an-
nouncement of his name and business in connection with pro-
grams." 23
At the present time it would seem impossible for the Commis-
sion to do more in remedying the commercialized character of
the programs than simply to give to those stations which show
themselves technically and financially qualified to render superior
programs a preference in the assignment of "channels" and to
eliminate as nearly as possible "direct advertising."24 If radio
programs are to be improved in their educational and entertain-
ment value by the elimination of the tint of commercialism the
impetus for such improvement probably must come in a large
measure from the radio public through its power of indirect cen-
sorship over the stations themselves. 25
A clearer case for administrative regulation arises when a
station permits the broadcast of false and misleading advertising
or programs which are positively harmful to the public wel-
fare. An instance of the latter occurred in the recent case of
KFKB Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission.2  Sta-
tion KFKB was controlled by a certain doctor who operated it to
further the interests of a pharmaceutical association and a hos-
pital which he controlled. Over this station the doctor prescribed
treatments for patients whom he had never seen, basing his
diagnosis upon the symptoms recited to him by the patient in
letters addressed to the station. The prescriptions usually
recommended were designated by number and procurable only
233d A. R. F. R. C. (1929) 35.
24 The National Committee on Education by Radio has urged that college
and university broadcasting stations should be given a preference in the
assignment of channels and thus "help to offset the present tendency to-
-ward centralization and net work monopoly." U. S. Daily, Mar. 9, 1931, at
54.
2 According to a recent survey by Commissioner Lafount more than
ten per cent of the "time on the air" of American broadcasting stations
is devoted to programs educational in character. Out of 605 licensed sta-
tions as of Feb. 1, 1931, there are 51 "educational stations." U. S. Daily,
iar. 10, 1931, at 65. "A safeguard which some of the leading stations em-
ploy, is the association with the station of an advisory board made up of
men and women whose character, standing, and occupation will insure a
-well rounded program best calculated to serve the greatest portion of the
population in the region to be served." ad A. R. F. R. C. (1929) 35.
See supra note 11.
26 U. S. Daily, Feb. 9, 1931, at 3760 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1931). Commis-
sioner Lafount has characterized this decision as a precedent long awaited
and long needed in the realm of radio law.
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from the pharmaceutical association. The Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia upheld the Commission's order denying
the renewal of the station's license on the ground that the sta-
tion was being conducted only in the personal interest of a doc-
tor indulging in a practice "inimical to public health and safety."
Though the facts of this case clearly justified a refusal to
renew the license the question arises as to how far the Commis-
sion will go into the limitless field of censoring advertising and
judging the quality of the product advertised. Newspapermen
insist that advertising barred by the representative newspapers-
including programs featuring "seers, gold brick promoters and
quack doctors"--is common over almost every radio station.-7
The air has been used as a medium for conducting lotteries, ad-
vertising fraudulent securities and urging boycotts.-5 One means
of controlling advertising of Such a character is through the
issuance of cease and desist orders by the Federal Trade Com-
mission.29 If the Federal Radio Commission undertakes to pass
upon the quality of advertising and the authenticity or safety
of the advertised product it may open up for itself a field of
activity too vast to be handled by its present organization. The
Commission will probably be forced to limit its attempts to con-
trol advertising to those cases where the station appears to be
operated in furtherance of purely private interests or is used
asL a medium for patently fraudulent or harmful practices. By
such limitation the Commission will avoid the determination of
collateral issues of fact and law which it is not qualified to
handle and which may more properly come within the domain
of the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice.
By making the most of the KFKB decision, however, the Com-
mission should be able to effect a long needed regulation of radio
programs, a regulation which should be limited only by the mag-
nitude of the task and by the requirement that at all times such
regulation be undiscriminating.
27 See VA'mrY (Mlar. 11, 1931) 65.
2S HARINGS o, H. R. 15430 (70th Cong. 2d Sess. 1929) 8. On Feb. 26,
1931 Senator McNary introduced a bill (S. 6240) at the instance of the
National Editorial Association to prohibit lotteries or other schemes offer-
ing prizes dependent upon chance. This was intended to eliminate dis-
crimination against newspapers and other periodicals which may not ac-
cept such advertisements under the postal regulations. U. S. Daily, Feb.
27, 1931, at 3967. A similar bill is pending in the House.
29 Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 483, 42
Sup. Ct. 384 (1922). See Handler, False and Misleadibg Advertising (1929)
39 YALE L. J. 22, 42. That body, however, has recently been refused the
power to pass upon fhe authenticity and safety of an advertised product
where there is no question of "unfair competition." Raladam Y. Federal
Trade Commission, 42 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930). See Comment
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 617.
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SUPERViSION OF RAILROAD REORGANIZATION EX-
PENSES BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS-
SION
THE regulation of railroad reorganizations has been character-
ized as one of the most difficult and unsuccessful functions of
the Interstate Commerce Commission., The Commission is not
expressly authorized to control reorganizations, but its approval
is necessary under Section 20 (a) of the Transportation Act 2 for
the issue of securities by the new company in accordance with
the reorganization plan. Thus jurisdiction is acquired after
long and delicate negotiations have at last crystallized into
agreements approved by the courts-when a'denial of the ap-
plication means that the receivership must be indefinitely con-
tinued and the work of reorganization undertaken anew. Placed
in this difficult position, the Commission has sometimes seemed
to act against its better judgment, giving reluctant authoriza-
tion to reorganizations of which it did not really approve.3 Some
opportunity for more flexible and effective control is afforded by
the provisioii of Section 20 (a) which allows the application to be
granted "upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may
deem necessary or appropriate." Representative of the general
situation is the attempt to control by this means the "expenses"
and fees of reorganization managers and committees.
In the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization of 1922 the Com-
mission first took jurisdiction over reorganization expenses, say-
ing, "There is involved an important question of public inter-
1 "In administering the provisions of the transportation act of 1920,
which impose upon, us the duty of supervising the issue of securities by
railroad companies, we are faced by no more difficult problem than in con-
nection with reorganizations following receiverships. In the past such
reorganizations have largely been a matter of bargain and trade between
groups of security holders without adequate consideration of the paramount
public interest, so that the results have often been consistent neither with
the public interest nor even with sound business principles, and recurring
receiverships have been far from uncommon. In this very case our records
show that this is not the first receivership through which the property has
passed." Eastman dissenting in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization,
76 I. C. C. 84, 108 (1922).
"Perhaps the strongest objection that can be made to the Commission's
policy is in connection with reorganizations. Undoubtedly cases of this
sort are difficult to handle, since failure to approve of a plan will undo the
labor of years, prolong the receivership, and involve further expensive
negotiations between the various classes of security holders." LOKLIN,
REGULATION OF SECURITY ISSUES (1925) 16; ibid. c. 10.
241 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20(a) (1929).
3 Cf. Securities of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Ry., 67 1. C. C. 61
(1921); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization, mspra note 1; Reorganiza-
tion of Georgia & Florida Ry., 117 1. C. C. 473 (1926); Chicago, lilwaukee
& St. Paul Reorganization, 131 I. C. C. 673 (1928).
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est." 4 The public interest was there not difficult to discover,
for the expenses were plainly included within the capitalization
of the new company, thus swelling fixed charges and increasing
the rate base. The assenting security holders of the old com-
pany received bonds of the new up to the full amount of their
cash assessments, out of which were paid the fees of the re-
organization managers and their counsel. Commissioner AMc-
Manamy, dissenting from the order which determined the fees,
suggested that a method should be devised whereby the capital
structure of the new company would not be burdened with the
costs of reorganization.5 Commissioner Eastman, fearing that
means would be found for accomplishing much the same result
by indirection, said, "Whatever the apparent method of provid-
ing for them, such expenses will continue to be a matter of vital
public concern." 6
The method adopted in the reorganization of the Chicago,
Milwaukee, & St. Paul 7 is apparently in accord with Commis-
sioner llclManam's suggestion. In return for one share of
common stock of the old company and a cash assessment of $28,
each depositing shareholder received one share of no-par com-
mon stock in the new company and $24 in bonds. Out of the
$4 fund thus secured $2.50 was set aside to pay the actual ex-
penses of reorganization, s any balance to be paid to the new com-
pany; and $1.50 to provide for the compensation of managers,
committees and counsel, any balance to be paid to the new com-
pany or the shareholders as the managers should decide. The
Commission granted the application to issue the new securities
upon the express condition that no amounts should be paid out
of the $4 fund "unless and until authorized by due order of the
Court or by this Commission." The securities were issued and
reorganization consummated, but the Supreme Court decided,
Stone, Brandeis and Holmes dissenting, that "the condition in
respect to the special fund of $1.50 was properly set aside and
its enforcement enjoined by the court below."o
476 I. C. C. at 106 (1922).
zMissouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization, 99 I. C. C. at 341 (1925). Cf.
Acquisition Stock Issue by Northern Colorado & Eastern R. R., 86 I. C. C.
617 (1924); Reorganization of Georgia & Florida Ry., supra note 3; Kan-
sas City, -M. & 0. Reorganization, 145 I. C. C. 339 (1928).
6 99 I. C. C. at 340.
7 Supra note 3.
8 These expenses included costs of foreclosure, court allowances, en-
graving, charges of corporate trustees, etc.
9 United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. R., 51 Sup.
Ct. 159 (1931). Chief Justice Hughes took no part in the consideration
of the case. The Court held that the order of the Commission authorizing
the securities continued operative even though the condition was annulled,
using as an analogy the rejection by the Court of an unconstitutional con-
dition imposed by a state upon the grant of a privilege, and citing Frost
1931]
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The opinion of the Court justified the decision on the ground
that the condition related to matters beyond the jurisdiction of
the Commission because entirely outside the realm of interstate
commerce. 10 Were the argument limited to Section 20(a), it
might be supported on the theory that the expense fund was
not capitalized in the security issue which the Commission was
asked to authorize. But even this contention is doubtful, since
the whole $4 fund may be regarded as part of the price of no-
par common stock, "short circuited" through the hands of the
reorganization managers." More dangerous and less defensi-
ble is the proposition that the agreement creating the fund was
beyond the realm of interstate commerce. Dangerous because it
would cripple any attempt of the Commission or Congress to
devise more effective methods of controlling railroad reorganiza-
tions; indefensible because it disregards the principle of the de-
cisions which have sustained and interpreted the Transportation
Act of 1920.
Provisions of the recapture,12 joint rate,13 and intra-state
rate 14 clauses have all been justified by their tendencies to assure
an efficient transportation system. The Act also recognized that
one requisite of adequate service was the rehabilitation of rail-
road credit in order that sufficient capital might be secured-"
Almost synonomous with the rehabilitation of credit is the pro-
tection of the investor from such exploitation as has disgraced
the history of railroad finance.'0 Not only is this desirable
v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
Justice Stone challenged the analogy on the ground that the state could
take further action, such as withdrawing or restricting the privilege,
whereas the Commission was deprived of all further jurisdiction.
10 The district court held that the disposal of the $2.50 fund was within
the jurisdiction of the Commission because the plan provided that any bal-
ance left after the payment of expenses should go to the new company.
"So though no part of the $2.50 was to be capitalized by the issuance
of new bonds, such part of the same as remained after the payment of
foreclosure expenses did become part of the property back of the preferred
and common stock." Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. v. United
States, 33 F. (2d) 582, 588 (N. D. Ill. 1929).
11 See dissenting opinion of Justice Stone in the principal case, 51 Sup.
Ct. at 166.
12Dayton Goose Greek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct.
169 (1924).
'3 New England Division's Case, 261 U. S. 184, 43 Sup. Ct. 270 (1923).
14 Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257 U. S.
563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1922).
'2 See United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U. S. 478, 483, 50 Sup. Ct.
212, 213 (1930); Burgess, Federal Regulation of Railway Management and
Finance (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 705, 721.
16 The Commission in recommending that it be given the power to regulate
railway securities stressed the importance of making them more secure
investments for the public. See 21ST ANNUAL REPORT OF TUS I. C. C,
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in order to encourage confidence in railroad securities, but it
seems also the logical converse of a theory of government which
limits the investor in public utilities to a "fair" return on his
investment. Nor does protection seem any the less appropriate
when bankers have constituted themselves protective committees
and reorganization managers, and the security holder is faced
with the alternative of either accepting their terms or relinquish-
ing his equity in the business. 8 The exercise of the commerce
power in such a situation seems no more paternalistic than the
use of "Blue-sky" laws to prevent fraud and imposition in the
sale of corporate securities.", Thus federal regulation of reor-
ganization negotiations appears as a legitimate part of a larger
function: the protection of the investor in railway securities for
the purpose of fostering interstate commerce.
To the Court's second objection that the condition imposed
by the Commission violated the guarantees of the Fifth Amend-
ment it might be answered that the "federal police power" has
often been allowed to seriously curtail rights of property." But
(1907) 22 et seq. The recommendation was repeated every following year
until 1918. Abuses in railroad finance were revealed in investigations con-
ducted by the Commission. The New England Investigation, 27 1. C. C.
560 (1913); Financial Investigation of the New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford R. R., 31 I. C. C. 32 (1914); Financial Transaction of Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Ry., 36 I. C. C. 43 (1915); In re Pere Marquette R. R. and
C. H. & D. Ry., 44 I. C. C. 1 (1917); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Investigation, 131 I. C. C. 615 (1928).
17 State courts have sometimes spoken of the purpose of public utility
statutes and *the duty of Public Service Commissions to protect investors
in public utility securities. See People ex rel. Delaware & Hudson Co. v.
Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1, 10, 90 N. E. 60, 63 (1909); Bulkely v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford R. R., 216 Mass. 432, 436, 103 N. E. 1033, 1035
(1914).
18 In the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization hearing before the Com-
mission, counsel for the reorganization managers said, "I attach less
importance to the approval by the depositors than to the approval by the
various committees. The depositors had no choice but to deposit or reject
the plan . . ." 99 I. C. C. at 333. But Commissioner Eastman in his dis-
sent pointed out that the weight of the approval of the Committees to the
agreement fixing the compensation of the managers was impaired by the
fact that the managers were the sole judges of the compensation of the
committees. 99 I. C. C. at 334. The observations apply equally to the
Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Reorganization.
19 Cf. Hall v. Gieger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217 (191G).
Somewhat comparable to the protection of the investor from financial
hazards seems the protection of the bank depositor. Cf. Noble State Bank
v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 18G (1911); Abie State Bank v.
Weaver, 51 Sup. Ct. 252 (1931).
2o In, Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, Chief Justice Taft
characterized a federal statute, which purported to regulate the board of
trade as a part of interstate commerce, as "a reasonable regulation in the
exercise of the police power of the National Government" 262 U. S. 1,
41, 43 Sup. Ct. 470, 479 (1923). For other recent cases wherein the com-
1931]
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the objection seems to be further invalidated by current legal
theory concerning reorganization agreements. The relationship
between depositing stockholders and their reorganization, man-
agers has been treated as fiduciary rather than purely contrac-
tual.21 The depositor has been able, on mere suspicion of wrong-
doing, to call the managers to account in equity for their ex-
penditures,22 and vainly have the latter attempted to contract
out of liability for mishandling funds entrusted to their care.
2 3
The trust theory, as thus developed, seems applicable to the $1.50
fund created by the St. Paul agreement, for it was collected by
the reorganization managers, not as their compensation, but as
the source out of which they were to pay themselves a certain
percentage of the amount of bonds outstanding, the protective
committees and counsel reasonable fees for their services, and
the new company or the stockholders any balance remaining.
At those "reasonable fees," which were left entirely to the dis-
cretion of the reorganization managers and which they could
have been called upon to justify in a court of equity, the order
of the Commission seems to have been particularly directed.
Thus the imposition of the condition in question, instead of be-
ing, as the Court intimates, an interference with liberty of
contract, was but the extension of the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission over matters otherwise left to judicial determination.
This difficulty of concurrent jurisdiction is present in most
railroad reorganizations. The divided authority exercised by
court and commission has perhaps militated against vigorous
regulation by either. Certainly the Commission has been criti-
cized both from within and without for its passive attitude, and
it has been -suggested that a more constructive policy might be
developed if the plans of the reorganization managers were sub-
mitted to the Commission before being approved by the share-
merce power has §eemed to operate quite independently of the Fifth Amond-
ment of. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup.
Ct. 220 (1929); Texas & N. 0. R.'R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steam-
ship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427 (1930) and Comment (1930)
40 YALE L. J. 92.
21 Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Rcor-
ganizations (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 899, 922; Note (1928) 41 HAuY. L. REV.
377.
22 Mawhinney v. Bliss, 117 App. Div. 255, 102 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st
Dep't 1907) 2 cf. Mills v. Potter, 189 Mass. 238, 75 N. E. 627 (1905);
Parker v. New England Oil Corp., 4 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1924), 8 F.
(2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1925), 13 F. (2d) 158 (D. Mass. 1926), 16 F. (2d)
838 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927), 19 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927). But of.
Venner v. Fitzgerald, 91 Fed. 335 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899).
23 Industrial & General Trust Ltd. v. Tod, 180 N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7
(1905); See Carter v. First National Bank of Pocahontas, 128 Md. 581,
591, 98 Atl. 77, 80 (1916).
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holders or the court.24 The possibilities of such development are
considerably diminished by the decision of the Supreme Court,
which seems to remove the whole field of reorganization negotia-
tions from the jurisdiction of the Commission.2 The result
raises sharply the question whether these negotiations should
be left to the conduction of self-appointed and interested bankers,
who reap large profits though they furnish no capital and assume
small iisks.2- The ineffectiveness of the present system is itself
support for the suggestion that the authority of the Commission
should be expressly extended to the end that the reorganization
of railroads may be conducted by experts as "work done in the
administration of a public trust." 27
LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANIES TO SETTLE
POLICIES for liability insurance generally impose upon the in-
surance company the duty of defending a suit against the in-
sured. This duty usually carries with it the exclusive control
of the action and the privilege of settling the suit. If, however,
the underwriter refuses to defend a claim which is later held
to be covered by the policy, settlement or defense by the insured
has been held not to discharge the underwriter.2 Once the un-
24 See dissenting opinions of Commissioner Eastman in Denver & Rio
Grande Western Reorganization, 90 L C. C. 141 (1924), and in Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, supra note 3. See also supra note 1.
25 It has also been suggested that the decision may have an unfortunate
effect upon forthcoming railroad consolidations. A Bad Onz n for Rail-
road Consolidation (1931) 55 THE NEW REPUBLIC 313.
26 In the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul agreement the compensation
of the Committees and managers was contingent upon the success of the
plan, thus placing upon them the risk of loss of time and their own office
expenses. But they did not underwrite the issue of new securities or
perform any essential banking functions.
27 See Commissioner Eastman's dissent in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reor-
ganization, 99 I. C. C. at 341.
It has been queried whether these claims are not in effect agreements
of maintenance and so void. 77 CENT. L. J. 369. But "the validity of the
clause in these contracts that prohibits the insured from settling without
the consent of the insurer... appears everywhere to have been recognized
by the courts, and although we have not found any particular discussion of
this question in the cases, it would seem to necessarily follow ... that they
are not regarded as opposed to sound public policy." General 'Accident
Assurance Corp. v. Louisville Home Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 9G, 104, 193
S. W. 1031, 1034 (1917); of. Gould v. Brock, 221 Pa. 38, 69 At]. 1122
(1908). See Note (1923) 8 MrNN. L. REv. 151.
2 St. Louis Provision Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 201 U. S. 173, 26
Sup. Ct. 400 (1906). Cf. Attleboro Manufacturing Co. v. Frankfort In-
surance Co., 171 Fed. 495, 499 (D. Mass. 1909); Southern Railway News
Co. v. Fidelity Co., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1217, 83 S. W. 620 (1904); In re
19311
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derwriter assumes the management of a case,3 any voluntary
act by the insured preventing a full defense,4 or even a failure
to cooperate in the defense,5 has been held to discharge the under-
writer from any liability. This protectibn afforded underwriters
has been justified as necessary to prevent collusion between the
injured and the insured.6 To the query whether the interests
of the assured are in all respects sufficiently guarded by the stipu-
lations in the contract the courts have answered, "The insured
had the same right that other individuals have to make their own
contracts." 7
Empire State Surety Co., 214 N. Y. 553, 108 N. E. 825 (1915); United
States Fidelity Co. v. Pressler, 185 S. W. 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916);
Bradley v. Standard Insurance Co., 46 Misc. 41, 93 N. Y. Supp. 245 (Sup.
Ct. 1904). Inaction by the insurer privileges the insured to act as if the
insurer had refused to act. Interstate Casualty Co. v. Wallins Creek Coal
Co., 164 Ky. 778, 176 S. W. 217 (1915). But of. Carthage Stone Co. v.
Travelers' Insurance Co., 186 Mo. App. 318, 172 S. W. 458 (1915). The
amount recovered by the injured in such a suit is then the prima fade lia-
bility of the insurer in a suit by the insured. St. Louis Provision Co.
v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra; Butler v. American Fidelity Co., 120
Minn. 157, 139 N. W. 355 (1913). But the insured cannot recover from
the underwriter the costs of defending a groundless claim. Cornell v,
Travelers' Insurance Co., 175 N. Y. 239, 67 N. E. 578 (1903); Nesson v.
United States Casualty Co., 201 Mass. 71, 87 N. E. 191 (1909). Conitra:
Knoxville Brick Co. v. Empire State Surety Co., 126 Tenn. 402, 150 S. W.
92 (1912). Consequently policies now bind the underwriter to defend suits
"although such suits . . . are wholly groundless, false or fraudulent." Of.
Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl.
708 (1924).
3 Once undertaken, the defense cannot be withdrawn even though the
claim be groundless or not covered by the policy. This is predicated on
the theory that either (1) the insurer is bound by his election to defend,
Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N. Y. 235, 104 N. E. 622 (1914);
Sachs v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 App. Div. 494, 156 N. Y. Supp. 419
(2d Dep't 1915); or (2) the insurer is estopped to deny that the accident
is not within terms of the policy, Flen Falls v. Travelers' Insurance Co.,
162 N. Y. 399, 56 N. E. 897 (1900); Canning Co. v. Guaranty & Accident
Co., 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911). See (1916) 16 COL. L. REV.
257.
4 American Surety Co v. Ballman, 104 Fed. 634 (E. D. Mo. 1900) ; Eaton
v. Lyman, 26 Wis. 61 (1870). Payment of a judgment by the insured
before appeal discharges the insurer. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Marchand,
[1924] 4 D. L. R. 157 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1923). But that it should not in juris-
dictions where payment of a judgment does not preclude appeal, see (1924)
38 HARv. L. Rnv. 1115. Cf. Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note 3.
5 Coletnan v. Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N. Y. 271, 160 N. E. 367
(1928); Guerin v. Indemnity Casualty Co., 107 Conn. 649, 142 Atl. 268
(1928); VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 916.
6 See Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity Co., 162 Wis. 39, 48, 155 N. W.
1081, 1085 (1916); cf. Pickett v. Fidelity Co., 60 S. C. 477, 38 S. E. 160
(1901); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 Atl. 503
(1899).
" Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity Co., vapra note 6.
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Yet an unresolved conflict as to the full extent and the legal
basis of the underwriter's duty to protect these interests of the
insured has arisen where a refusal of the underwriter to accept
a proffered settlement within the face of the policy has been
followed by a judgment greatly in excess of the policy., Under
such circumstances the court is faced with several practical con-
siderations. The projected settlement will be advantageous to
the insured whose responsibility above the amount of the policy
is unlimited. On the other hand where such a settlement ap-
proximates the maximum coverage of the policy it may fre-
quently be to the advantage of the underwriter to contest the
action and force the insured to risk an adverse judgment in ex-
cess of the policy.9 But since judgments generally do not exceed
the face of the policy, the "privilege of settlement" which the
insured "freely" granted the underwriter may well be construed
as giving the underwriter just such an advantage.",
This was the view taken in a recent Mississippi case in which
the court refused to find the underwriter bound to an absolute
duty to accept a compromise within the face of the policy while
appealing a judgment in excess thereof.1' The insured brought
his action in tort, merely claiming the failure to settle, ipso facto,
to be negligence. The court found the action to be circumscribed
by the contract, however, and held the insured had no right to
complain since the underwriter had performed its duty of de-
fense and could not be held for the excess of the judgment over
the policy simply because it had not exercised its privilege to
settle. In refusing to allow an action in tort, the court finds
support in the New York rule presented in Best Building Co. v.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation: - "The contract
of the parties must measure the liability in the absence of fraud
or bad faith. ... There is no implied obligation in thR insurance
policy in this case that the company must or will settle according
to the offer made." 13 Courts generally hold with New York that
s This is illustrated in the recent cases of Hilker v. Western Automobile
Insurance Co., 231 N. W. 257 (Wis. 1930); Georgia Casualty Co. v.
Cotton Mills Products Co., 132 So. 73 (Mliss. 1931); Stowers Furniture
Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S. W. (2d) 544 (Tex. Comm. App.
1929).
9 Cf. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 917.
10 Moreover, the cost of compromising claims which would be defeated
if litigated might be passed on to the insured in the form of higher
premiums.
" Georgia Casualty Co. v. Cotton Mills Products Co., supra note 8. An
offer to settle a judgment of $12,500 for $9,000 was rejected by the under-
writer (of a $10,000 policy) and an appeal was pressed. The judgment was
affirmed. Mills Products Co. v. Oliver, 153 Mliss. 362, 121 So. 111 (1929).
The present suit was brought on an agreed statement of facts.
12247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. E. 911 (1928).
13 Ibid. 455, 160 N. E. at 912. Cf. Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
1931]
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this "option" to settle imposes no duty to settle. 4
A Texas court, however, faced with a similar case,"- followed
the minority lead of Douglas v. United States Fidelity Co.1" In
the Douglas case the underwriter was regarded as having "con-
tracted to take charge of the defense of the claim," so that the
contract "created a relation out of which grew the duty to use
care when action was taken." 17 The underwriter, having un-
dertaken the defense, by that fact alone is generally held re-
sponsible for a negligent handling of the case,1" and courts adopt-
ing the minority rule place the underwriter under a duty of due
care to settle, as it is privileged to do, if such a course be pru-
dent.19
But the recent Wisconsin case of Hilker v. Western Automobile
Insurance Co.,2" while in accord with the Douglas case in its
result, maintains a closer adherence to contractual principle, and
indicates a possible mode of relaxing the rule in the Best case.
In the Hilker case, the court, overruling an earlier Wisconsin
decision,1 held that the insurance company by contracting to de-
fend or settle became the agent of the insured; 22 as such the un-
236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E. 577 (1923); McAleenan v. Insurance Co., 173
App. Div. 100, 159 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't 1916), alf'd, 219 N. Y.
563, 114 N. E. 114 (1916); Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort General Insurance
Co., 237 N. Y. 60, 142 N. E. 352 (1923); Brunswick Realty Co. v.
Frankfort Insurance Co., 99 Misc. 639, 166 N. Y. Supp. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1917) ;
Drilling v. New York Life Insurance Co., 234 N. Y. 234, 137 N. E. 314
(1922).
S14 Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity Co., supra note 6; New Orleans
& Carrollton R. R. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 (1905);
Schmidt v. Insurance Co., 224 Pa. 286, 90 Atl. 653 (1914) ; Wakefield v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N. W. 643 (1929), noted in (1920)
39 YALE L. J. 284; Fenton v. Fidelity, 36 Ore. 283, 56 Pac. 1096 (1890);
Ross v. Ahierican Employer's Liability Insurance Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 41,
38 Atl. 22 (1897); Davies v. Maryland Cqsualty Co., 89 Wash. 571, 154
Pac. 1116 (1916); Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 175
Minn. 181, 221 N. W. 61 (1928); Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers'
Insurance Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 946 (1917).
Is Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., suprm note 8. An
offer .by the injured to settle for $4000 was rejected by the underwriter
of a $5000 policy who refused to pay more than $2500. Judgment was
rendered for $14,107.15. The insured charged that in the light of the
evidence it was imprudent for the underwriter to refuse to settle.
1 6 Supr note 2.
17 Ibid. 376, 127 Atl. at 711.
18 Attleboro Manufacturing Co. v. Frankfort Insurance Co,, supra note
2; Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583 (1920).
19 Cavanaugh v. General Assurance Corp., 79 N. H. 186, 106 Atl. 604
(1919); Attleboro Manufacturing Co. v. Frankfort Insurance Co., supra
note 2; of. Brown & McChbe v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 232
Fed. 298 (D. Ore. 1915).
20o Supra note 8.
21 Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity Co., supra note 6.
22 Agency can be contracted for if the parties so desire even though the
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derwriter was required to conform to a standard of good faith
in performing its duty of defense. Then, by presenting the issue
of "bad faith" to the jury, the duty of settling when prudent was
implied from the duty to defend, for the underwriter was held
to "that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary
care and prudence would exercise in the management bf his own
business, were he investigating and adjusting such claims." 23
The Wisconsin court may be right in its contention that the
tendency of the law is to extend the liability of insurance com-
panies, but it is doubtful whether courts committed to the strict
contract rule will overcome their reluctance to find bad faith,
and thus adopt the jury test here advocated. Even in cases
where the underwriter has admitted that offers to settle were
reasonable and yet refused to accept the settlement unless the in-
sured would contribute, such coercion of the insured has not
been held to be bad faith since the underwriter was merely exer-
cising its legal rights in going to trialU' Thus intrenched in
their contention that the underwriter must be allowed a free
hand in refusing to accept an offered settlement which it con-
siders disadvantageous, the courts adopting the New York rule,
having already denied a jury test by rejecting the negligence
action, are not likely to admit it under the guise of "bad faith." -5
Even in these jurisdictions, however, the insured is not alto-
gether helpless. Policies may be made to provide for an in-
creased coverage where the underwriter, having the opportunity
to settle, elects to defend..2 G Failing this, the insured may settle
with the injured for the amount of a possible judgment in excess
of the policy.2  The courts appear willing to brush aside the
contention that a part settlement might be held to estop the
underwriter from denying liability in a subsequent suit under
interests of the agent are adverse to those of his principal; the conduct
of the agent is subjected to "close scrutiny" to determine whether he acted
in bad faith toward the principal. 231 N. W. at 260.
23 Ibl 261.
2 4 Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note 13; Levin v. New Eng-
land Casualty Co., 101 Misc. 402, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1055 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
But cf. Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort General Insurance Co., supra note 13.
The minority courts are contra: Brown & McCabe v. London Guarantee
& Accident Co., suprac note 19.
25 "Is a jury to say that the insurance company was guilty of negligence
in choosing to try out such a question in the courts rather than to settle?
This question suggests the wisdom of adhering to the contract of insurance
which the parties have made." Best Building Co. v. Employer's Liability
Assurance Corp., supra note 12, at 456, 160 N. E. at 912.
26 Georgia Life Insurance Co. v. Mississippi Central R. I., 110 Mliss.
114, 76 So. 646 (1917).
-General Assurance Corp. v. Louisville Home Telephone Co., mtpra
note 1; of. London Guaranty & Accident Co. v. Mississippi Central R. R.,




the policy.8 It now appears general practice for the insured to
make some contribution to the underwriter for relinquishing its
option to defend, even where the proposed settlement is acceptable
to all parties.1 The burden of settling for the" excess would
probably be no greater were the insured compelled to settle alone,
leaving th6 underwriter to fight the case up to the face of the
policy. To one not too subject to the niceties of legal theory,
however, the decision of a minority court holding an underwrit-
er's coercing an insured into contributing to a settlement for
less than the face of the policy to be "lack of good faith" 10 seems
most equitable. If the majority courts should accept this defini-
tion of "bad faith," the rule of construction in the Best case
could provide all that is desired in the negligence actions allowed
in other jurisdictions, while still guarding the underwriter
against the dangers of the jury in tort actions.
28 Cf. McAleenan v. Insurance Co., supra note 13.
29 Cf. Levin v. New England Casualty Co., supra note 24.
30 Brown & McCabe v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., supra note
19. See (1918) 18 COL. L. Ru. 369; (1916) 26 YALE L. J. 74.
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